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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
\•/ALTER J. THOMAS I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
17340 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with and pleaded guilty 
to one count of forcible sexual abuse upon a child, pursuant 
to Utat Code Annotated § 76-5-404 (1) (b). After an initial 
commitment to the Utah State Hospital and a later imposition 
of a suspended sentence and placement on probation, the 
appellant's probation was revoked and he was incarcerated 
in the Utah State Prison. 
The appellant sought relief in the form of a 
Petition for habeas corpus which was denied when respondent's 
motion to dismiss was granted. Thereafter, respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stipulated to an order vacating the judgment of d · · ism1ssa'. 
Appellant's second application for habeas corpus relief 
'1 
I was similarly dismissed; from that order the present appe; I 
is taken. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 




habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, in ar.: 
for Salt Lake county. The respondent moved to dismiss ti· I 
petition. The Honorable James S. Sawaya, took the motio:. 
under advisement and eventually dismissed the petition. 
The respondent later stipulated to a motion to vacate tbe 
order of dismissal. After considering appellant's reply 
memorandum and respondent's supplemental memorandum in 
support of a motion to dismiss, the court again granted 
the motion to dismiss on the grounds stated in responden:'• 
memoranda. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order and judgment 
affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the 
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus· 
i 
-2- l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant was charged with the crime of 
forcible sexual abuse, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-404 (1) (b), a felony of the third deqree (R. at S). 
on October 1, 1973, the appellant entered a plea of guilty 
to the charge and the court ordered a mental evaluation 
of the appellant for purposes of a sanity hearing (R. at 14) . 
Based on expert testimony produced at the hearing (the 
date of the hearing does not appear in the record) , the 
court found that the appellant suffered from an abnormal 
mental condition, and on Hovember 8, 1973, ordered him 
to be committed to the Utah State Hospital for life "or 
until such time as further action as provided" by U.C.A. 
§ 77-49-1 et seq. occurred (R. at 6,14). The court further 
ordered that the appellant be returned to the court on 
November 8, 1974 to hear additional psychiatric evaluations 
of the appellant's status (R. at 6). The appellant took 
no direct appeal from the court's order of commitment 
which issued November 8, 1973. Approximately two and one 
half months after the order of commitment was entered, a 
letter was written to the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins 
from doctors Johnson and Austin recommending that the 
appellant "could be more appropriately managed" in prison 
-3-
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.... 
rather than in a hospital setting. 
Apparently, the hearing which was scheduled fc: 
November 8, 1974,was held four months later on April 10, 
1975. During the April, 197 5 hearing, the appellant's 
status was reviewed and the recommendations from severai 
doctors at the Utah State Hospital were considered (R. at 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found no bas_: 
for placing the appellant on probation and the appellant 
was returned to the hospital (R. at 14, 15) . As before, 
no review of this decision was sought. In approximate!; 
May of 1977 (no definite date is found in the record), 
the court once again reviewed appellant's commitment to 
the hospital (R. at 15). On July 29, 1977, the court one' 
again reviewed appellant's status and sentenced him to~-
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison (R. at 15). The court, however, suspended 
the sentence and placed the appellant on probation on 'I 
condition that he take part in the Sexual Offenders Pnxr' 
at the Utah State Hospital and co!1tinue to reside at the 
hospital during his participation in the program (R. at -
Again, appellant sought no appellate review of 
the sente::-
1 
order. In December of 1977, the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole requested that the appellant's 
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his probation had been violated (R. at 15). The revocation 
request stated that the appellant had failed to abide by 
the rules and regulations of the Sexual Offender Program 
~ refusing to eat or drink for three days or to take the 
required medication, and by requesting to be released from 
t~ hospital (R. at 15). On January 25, 1978, the court 
ordered the appellant's probation revoked and the original 
sentence imposed on July 29, 1977 to commence. The 
appellant, again, sought no review of the revocation order. 
On October 29, 1979, the appellant filed a 
pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus (R. at 2). 
However, on the court's own motion, counsel was appointed 
to aid the appellant (R. at 11) . The petition alleged 
that sentence was unlawfully imposed and that appellant's 
due process rights had been violated (R. at 3) . The 
petition further alleged that appellant was entitled to 
credit for "time served in the Utah State Prison [Hospital)." 
On November 6, 1979, respondent filed a motion to dismiss 
the Petition, accompanied by a supportinq memorandum 
(R. at 12,14). On February 22, 1980, after a hearing 
at which arguments were considered, the court granted 
respondent's motion to dismiss (R. at 22). Once more, 
the appellant failed to take a timely appeal for review 
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of the order of dismissal. Later, on March 17, i 9801 
a stipulation to vacate the order of dismissal was 
filed to allow the appellant to submit a memorandum 
in response to the respondent's motion to dismiss (R. 
at 23) . After the filing of respondent's supplemental 
memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, an 
order granting the motion was entered (R. at 37). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT HAS WAIVED THE CONSIDERATION 
OF ISSUES CONCERNING SENTENCING BY FAILING 
TO RECORD TIMELY OBJECTIONS IN THE COURTS 
BELOW AND BY FAILING TO RAISE SUCH ISSUES 
ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
The chronology of events and statement of facts 
reveal that the appellant took no direct appeal from~ 
order of commitment or from the order imposing a suspende' 
sentence and probation. Similarly, there is no record o'. 
contemporaneous objections interposed to the lower court'' 
actions or attempts made by the appellant to assert his 
desire for sentencing and transfer to the Utah State pn::· 
previous to the instant petition for habeas corpus . 
. SU'' 
Failure of the appellant to properly preserve these 15 · 
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appellant's allegations raised in the instant appeal. 
In Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968), this 
~urt addressed the consideration of issues raised for 
the first time in an appeal from a denial of post-
conviction relief: 
If the contention of error is something 
which is known or should be known to the 
party at the time judgment was entered, 
it must be reviewed in the manner and 
within the ti~e permitted by regular 
prescribed [appellate] procedure, or the 
judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack 
This doctrine of waiver has been sustained in more recent 
opinions of this Court. See Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 
816 (Utah 1980); Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, the appellant was or should have been 
aware of any issue of sentencing delay at the time he was 
sentenced to a suspended term of confinement in the Utah 
State Prison and placed on probation on July 29, 1977. 
However, it was not until October 29, 1979, over two years 
after the appellant's probation was revoked, that the 
issue of sentencing delay was first raised in the present 
petition for habeas corpus. 
Appellant's present assertion of his alleged 
Sixth Amendment right to speedy sentencing is further 
weakened by the fact that the record on appeal contains 
-7-
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no mention of a contemporaneous objection interposed by 
the appellant to the court's order of commitment or 
sentencing procedure. Such contemporaneous objectiom 
are required to properly preserve issues on appeal. 
See Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 46 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Alternatively, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 sti:: 
that, "Within three months: For relief pursuant to a wm 
of habeas corpus. This limitation shall apply not only as 
to grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds which 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have bee~ 
known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner." A penoc 
of over two years expired between the order imposing a 
suspended prison sentence and probation on appellant on 
July 29, 1977, and the filing of the instant petition for 
habeas corpus relief on October 29, 1979. Certainly, any 
potential claim of sentencing delay allegedly in violauo: 
of the Sixth Amendment was apparent or should have been 
apparent in July of 1977 or at the latest in January of 
1978 when appellant's probation was revoked. It is also 
certain that any due process claim, equal protection c)ai: 
or claim for credit for commitment time at the state 
hospital was apparent at the time of sentencing. onlY tr.: 
-8-
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claim of judge disqualification escapes the application 
of the three ~onth statute of limitations. However, 
even the issue of judge disqualification was waived by 
appellant in the lower court (see Point IV infra) . 
As a general rule, the appellant should be 
barred from litigating these issues in the present appeal 
where they were neither preserved at trial by contemporaneous 
objection nor timely asserted on direct appeal. Appellant's 
contentions should be deemed waived for purposes of this 
appeal. 
The sole exception to the waiver doctrine occurs 
where an appellant shows both cause for his failure to 
comply with the state procedural rule, and actual prejudice 
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The appellant 
in the instant case makes no attempt to show either cause 
or prejudice. 
At every stage of the proceedings in the lower 
courts, the appellant was represented by counsel. Counsel 
was present when the plea of guilty was entered. Appellant 
was also represented by counsel at all hearings before 
and after corruni tment to the state hospital. Presently, 
the appellant makes no attempt to explain his lack of 
-9-
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compliance with procedural rules requiring co t 
n ernporaneou' 
objections at trial and that issues be raised on direct 
appeal where they were known or should have been known 
at the time of appeal. The requirement of "cause" has 
not been met. 
Correspondingly, appellant has failed to meet 
the prejudice requirement of the Wainwright test. Althou:· 
the opinion in Wainwright failed to provide guidelines as 
to the degree of prejudice that must be experienced to 
enable an appellant to overcome the waiver doctrine, 
subsequent decisions have provided appropriate standards, 
In United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979), three 
federal prisoners who had been denied parole sought to 
collaterally attack their sentences, alleging that a 
post-sentencing change in the policies of the Unit~ 
States Parole Commission had prolonged their actual 
imprisonment beyond the time intended by the sentencing 
judge. In holding that the alleged error did not support 
a collateral attack, the Court stated: "It has, of course, 
long been settled law that an error that may justify 
reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a 
collateral attack on a final judgI'lent." 442 U.S. at 184 · 
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of prejudice which would support a collateral attack: 
"The Court has held that an error of law does not provide 
a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error 
constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results 
ina complete miscarriage of justice." 442 U.S. at 185. 
If the alleged error claimed by appellant had in fact 
been an error, it would not rise to the level of a defect 
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 
justice. 
The appellant had numerous opportunities to 
assert his claims, but he failed to avail himself of the 
orderly processes of appellate procedure. Futhermore, 
the appellant's claims could have been tested in the lower 
courts at each of his review hearings as well as at the 
sentencing hearing, but the appellant failed in his duty 
to contemporaneously object to the proceedings. Moreover, 
the manner in which the commitment and sentence was imposed 
was proper and in every way consistent with the statutory 
requirements. 
The appellant has waived the consideration of 
issues contained in his present brief and petition for 
post-conviction relief by failing to comply with the 
Procedural requirements of appellate review of this state. 
~reover, he has failed to make the requisite demonstrations 
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of "cause" and "prejudice" to allow this Court to consid:: 
issues previously waived. 
POINT II 
THE COMMITMENT OF THE APPELLANT TO THE UTAH 
STATE HOSPITAL PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 77-49-1 
ET SEQ. AND THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING OF THE 
APPELLANT TO A SUSPENDED TERM OF CONFINEMENT 
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON, WERE DIRECTED BY 
THE LAWS OF UTAH UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE COURT, AND WERE NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-49-1 states: 
~vhenever any person is convicted of, or 
pleads guilty to, a charge of rape, sodomy, 
incest, indecent exposure, an attempt to 
cornrni t any of the foregoing er imes, assault 
with intent to commit rape, assault with 
intent to cornrni t sodomy, or indecent assault 
upon, and taking indecent liberties with t~ 
body of a minor child, and when it appears 
the court, either upon its own observation, 
or upon the testimony of a duly licensed 
physician that the person so convicted or 
pleading guilty is suffering from any form 
of abnormal or subnormal mental condition, 
or mental illness, the court shall order a 
mental examination of such person prior to 
imposition of sentence. 
In the present case, the appellant was charged with one c:. 
of forcible sexual abuse (U. C.A. § 76-5-404 (1) (b)), in thr 
he took indecent liberties with the body of a child unde: 
fourteen years of age (R. at 5). To this crime, the 
appellant entered a plea of guilty. Accordingly, the cour: 
ordered that a mental examination of the appellant be 
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conducted and the results be presented at a hearing. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, and upon the recommendation 
of the examining psychiatrists, who found evidence of an 
abnormal mental condition, the court committed the appellant 
to the Utah State Hospital 11 for life or until such time as 
further action as provided by said statute takes place. 11 
(R. at 6). By the imposition of this commitment the court 
was specifically referring to U.C.A. § 77-49-5 which states: 
If, however, it appears from such examination 
that the person convicted suffers from any 
form of abnormal or subnormal mental illness, 
or other psychosis, which caused the commission 
of the sex offense of which he was convicted, 
then the judge shall order the commitment of 
such person to the Utah state hospital, to be 
confined therein for life, unless he shall be 
paroled or pardoned as hereinafter provided. 
The court additionally ordered that the appellant be returned 
to the court one year from the date of the order if the 
appellant was still residing at the hospital (R. at 6}. 
On April 10, 1975, the court conducted a hearing 
in review of the appellant's status (R. at 14}. The court 
considered the recommendations of several doctors at the 
hospital but found no basis for placing the appellant on 
probation (R. at 14). In approximately May of 1977, the 
court again reviewed the appellant's commitment (R. at 15) · 
~July 29, 1977, the court sentenced the appellant to serve 
-13-
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an indeterminate sentence of from zero to five years a: 
the Utah State Prison but suspended the sent ence and Plac': 
the appellant on probation (R. at 15). The appellant's 
probation was conditioned on the requirement that the 
appellant participate in the Public Offenders Progr~ 
and reside at the hospital (R. at 15). At every stage, 
including the sentencing on July 29, 1977, the court's 
actions were taken pursuant to the laws of Utah. Sectior. 
77-49-7 of the Utah Code Annotated states in pertinent 
part that: 11 The parole, probation, or pardon authority 
may order the probation, parole, or pardon, following 
such certification, and may order the release of such 
persons upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as 
shall appear necessary to safeguard the convicted person 
and the public. 11 The appellant did not then, nor does 
he now, contest the propriety of the conditions placed 
on his probation. Similarly, the appellant at no time 
objected to the amount of time passing between the entry 
of his guilty plea and conviction, and the hearing at 
which probation was granted. Moreover, contrary to 
appellant's petition, the record contains no evidence 
documenting appellant's attempts to return to court for 
an earlier sentencing. It was not until four months afte: 
the appellant's probation had been revoked, that the 
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~pEllant, in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
i( asser~ed his claim of a violation of his Sixth Amendment 
r~ht to a speedy trial. Even more interesting is the 
fuct that after respondent filed the first motion to 
dismiss the petition, the appellant allowed the dismissal 
without filing any type of reply memorandum (R. at 24). 
This entire scenario of events demonstrates that the 
appellant has not acted with good faith in attempting to 
escape a legally imposed sentence. 
Statutes such as those under which the appellant 
was committed have generally withstood constitutional 
attacks such as those asserted by appellant. See 
Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). On equal 
protection grounds, such statutes are firm against attack 
since" [e] qual protection does not require that all persons 
be dealt with identically, but it does require that the 
distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for 
which the classification is made." State v. Little, 261 
N.W.2d 847, 850 (Neb. 1978). In Minnesota, the Court held 
that such classifications are reasonable since a legislature 
is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its 
restrictions to those classes where the needs are deemed 
to be the clearest. 
-15-
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Noticeably absent from appellant's brief is 
any authority expressly stating that the Sixth Amendment': 
guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the period of timE 
between conviction and sentencing. Appellant refers only 
to cases which assume arguendo that such an application 
is appropriate. In Pollard v. United States, 352 u.s. J); 
(1956), the defendant attacked the sentence he received 
in 1954 on the basis of the Sixth Amendment. In 1952, 
the defendant had pled guilty to a charge of embezzlement. 
The sentence that was then imposed later proved to ~ 
erroneous. It was not until 1954 that a valid sentence 
was finally imposed. The Court, assuming arguendo that t~.: 
sentence was part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment, stated that, "Whether delay in completing a 
prosecution such as here occurred amounts to an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of rights depends on the circumstanc" 
• u ~ ~-
. The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive. ,,. 
U.S. at 354. The Court, after finding that the delay was 
neither purposeful nor oppressive, held that the two yea: 
"delay" in sentencing did not violate the defendant's 
. . 1 . th se of United Sixth Amendment rights. Similar y, in e ca e----
States v. Tortorella, 391 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1968), also 
that a three year dela: cited by appellant, the court held 
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~tween the entry of a guilty plea and sentencing was 
iustified where the government requested the delay for 
the purposes of trying co-defendants who had not pleaded 
guilty. Appellant also refers to Lott v. United 
states, 309 F. 2d 115 (5th Cir. 1962), where the 
court, in affirming the propriety of a sentence 
~posed after a ninety-day delay stated, "Appellate 
courts must assume, in absence of anything in the 
record to the contrary, that delay in pronouncing 
sentence was for a lawful purpose in the orderly process 
of handling the case." 309 F.2d at 122. Appellant refers 
to United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2nd Cir. 1962). 
However, the decision in Grabina was later vacated and 
remanded by the United States Supreme Court on the basis 
of a recommendation by the Solicitor General. United 
States v. Grabina, 369 U.S. 426 (1961). Research does 
not disclose the final disposition of the case on remand, 
nor does it disclose the entire text of the Solicitor 
General's memorandum. However, a portion of the memorandum 
is quoted in United States v. DeBlasis, 206 F. Supp. 38, 
39, 40 (D.Md. 1962). This quoted portion refers primarily 
to a defendant's right of allocation and only vaguely refers 
to time constraints placed on the sentencing procedure. 
-17-
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At best, Gabrina only tangentially involves the issue 
of sentencing delay and is of no precedential value to 
this Court. Welsh v. United States, 348 F.2d 885 (6th 
Cir. 1965), cited by appellant wherein a four year "delay 
in sentencing was affirmed, also supports the respondent': 
position in the present case. 
In this case, the conuni tmen t to the Utah State 
Hospital, the subsequent sentence of probation, and the 
ultimate revocation of appellant's probation, were all 
accomplished pursuant to the laws of this state. Intere::. 
to note is the fact that in each of the cases cited by 
the appellant, the appellants there relied primarily upo~ 
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
support their cause. Rule 32 states in essence that 
sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. 
Appellant attempts to analogize this reliance with his 
reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 which states in 
pertinent part that the time for pronouncing judgment 
must be at least two days and not more than ten days afti'. 
the verdict. 
. th'' However, appellant's attempt to misuse .. 
statute to rob the court of jurisdiction to impose a val:' 
sentence must fail as attempts in the cases referred to 
by the appellant have failed. 
-18-
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In State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753 (Utah 1953), 
this court addressed the proper application of Utah code 
Ann. § 77-35-1. "This court has held that the time fixed 
~ the statute is not jurisdictional and since it 
is regarded as merely directory the further provision that 
the judgment should be rendered within a reasonable time 
has been judicially read into the statute." 262 P. 2d at 
755. Any "delay" which is attributable the operation of 
a particular statute, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-49-1 et 
seq., must be viewed as reasonable. Moreover, delay alone 
is not a sufficient reason to grant appellant's requested 
relief. As indicated in Pollard, supra, the appellant 
was required to demonstrate that any delay was purposeful 
or oppressive; no such demonstration is made in the instant 
case. Furthermore, even if the "delay" was labelled 
"purposeful" because corruni tment was ordered by the court, 
appellant fails to show that he suffered any prejudice. 
The leading case regarding the Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial is Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972). Although the delay in that case occurred between 
arrest and trial, in light of the assumption that the 
Sixth Amendment applies to sentencing delays, the principles 
of ~ may be extended to the instant case even though 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the appellant in this case stands on a much different fr .. ' 
"'1 
than an appellant who experiences delay before trial. 
The Court, in Barker, stated that the "deprivation of ti.' 
right to a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the 
accused' s ability to defend himself. " 4 O 7 u. s. at 521. 
Court then proposed a balancing test for resolving speeu: 
trial issues which identified four factors to be used in 
assessing whether a defendant had been deprived of his 
(1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (JI 
defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudiceto 
defendant. 407 u. s. at 530. In 
factors, it is important to note 
analyzing the first two 
that the "delay" in the I 
I 
I 
present case is significantly different than "delay" as 
commonly discussed. Most commonly, delay refers to a pd 
of time during which a proceeding should have occurred t;"f 
not because of a procedural breach by one of the parties·~ 
I 
causea the interruption of the normal course of events. 
However, in the present case, no procedural breach occur:o", 
I 
and the normal course of events, pursuant to law, contin::, 
uninterrupted. The appellant had been corrunitted for .1 
· 1 th d h 1 f s when, after sever,. approximate y ree an one- a year 
h t he should :l hearings, it was determined by the court t a 
1 
· Both t'I a suspended sentence and be placed on probation. 
conuni tment and sentence were authorized by law. seen 1~ · 
light, there was in fact no "delay" as the terr.i is cornrrc .. 
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used. Even if the corruni tment time could be termed "delay," 
the reason for the "delay" was justified. After the 
appellant's entry of a guilty plea, the court conducted 
a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-49-5 to determine 
whether the appellant suffered from an abnormal mental 
condition. Experts testifying at this hearing had found 
evidence of an abnormal or subnormal mental condition which 
contributed to the corrunission of the crime. Hearings 
conducted after the letter from Drs. Johnson and Austin 
(see Statement of Facts) addressed to the Honorable D. 
Frank Wilkins dated January 2 9, 19 7 4, recommending that 
the appellant be transferred to the Utah State Prison 
failed to elicit evidence sufficiently persuasive to support 
a transfer or earlier sentencing. Simply stated, no legal error 
was committed by the lower court in not transferring the 
appellant on the recommendation contained in the letter of 
January 2 9, 19 7 4. Such a recommendation is simply not 
binding on the court. To hold otherwise would allow a 
psychiatrist to impose sentence through his report. 
Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961). In other 
words, without an accompanying hearing, the letter alone 
did not rise to the level of a legal reason supporting the 
transfer of the appellant. 
An analysis of the third factor mentioned in 
~' the defendant's assertion of his Sixth Amendment 
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right, likewise does not favor the appellant• s posit· 
!Or •. 
He asserts that several attempts were made to return tc 
court for sentencing, yet the record does not support 
this assertion. In view of this deficiency, the appelL 
has failed to overcome his affirmative burden to 
demonstrate any purposeful delay by the State during or 
after the appellant IS assertion Of his Speedy trial rig'.: 
Likewise, there is no record of the appellant objecting·. 
or contesting his commitment. There is also no basis !c: 
assuming that the appellant at the review hearingsd~r 
i 
thing more than attempt to secure his release via probat:i 
I 
or pardon. There is no record of the appellant asserfr:I 
right to a speedy sentencing at any time previous to hi: 
present petition for habeas corpus. 
The fourth factor referred to in ~ is 
prejudice to the defendant. The appellant here does not 
demonstrate any prejudice, with the possible exceptionc' 
having to serve more time in the Utah State Prison than 
if there had been no commitment to the hospital. Howe·ie:, 
such a distinction affords no basis for habeas corpus re:! 
on either due process or equal protection grounds. 
Thibodeau 
People v. 
v. Commonwealth, 319 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 19 74 1· . 
Superior Court, 145 Cal.Rptr. 711 (Cal.APP· 1:·\ 
. t provisi:: 
the defendants assailed the extended cornrnitmen 
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California's mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) statute. 
They contended that they were denied equal protection since 
~rsons convicted of the same crime, but sentenced to prison 
rather than committed as MDSOs, were not subject to 
extensions of commitment past the maximum sentence. The 
court held that there was no violation in stating that, 
"The difference in the mental condition of the two classes 
is an adequate constitutional ground for the difference 
herein involved." 145 Cal. Rptr. at 715. This constitutionally 
sound difference is grounded in the reasons for commitment 
and prison confinement; prison confinement is punishment for 
the offense committed, whereas commitment for the sex offender 
is for the treatment and rehabilitation of the offender and the 
protection of society. Laws providing for the commitment of 
sex offenders are not penal in nature. Butler v. Burke, 
360 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1966). such underlying purposes of 
treatment and rehabilitation have formed the basis for 
nlli"erous laws which allow offenders corning within their 
purview to serve longer terms of supervision than the 
maximum confinement of those otherwise sentenced. See 
United States v. Vaught, 355 F.Supp. 1348 (W.D. Mo. 1972), and 
Guidry v. United States, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970), 
concerning youth offenders. 
Furthermore, because the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-49-1 et seq. were properly and constitutionally 
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applied to appellant, he lacks standing to challenge u,, 
here. This Court in State v. Phillips, 540 p 2 
• d 936 (C:,i 
1975), stated: 
Also important to be considered as 
pertaining to the problem in this case 
is the principle that no one should be 1 
entitled to challenge a statute and have 
it declared void because it may unjustly 
affect someone else, but could properly 
do so only if his own rights are adversely 
affected. 
i 
Because appellant was afforded all rights under the law) 
Constitution of Utah as well as under the United States 
Constitution, he has no standing to assert his present 
claims. 
POINT III 
SINCE THE APPELLANT' S COMMITMEHT TO THE 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL WAS FOR TREATMENT AND 
REHABILITATION, AND NOT PENAL IN NATURE, 
CREDIT FOR THE PERIOD OF COMMITMENT IS 
PROPERLY DENIED, AND IS, MOREOVER, AN 
ISSUE APPROPRIATELY DISPOSED OF BY THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS. 
! 
The appellant requests credit against his sente~ 
for time spent at the Utah State Hospital after Januaryi: 
1974. Apparently appellant reasons that sinceJanuaryl:i 
1974, was the date when it was suggested that the appe!lr 
be transferred to the Utah State Prison, he should obtai: 
credit for the time thereafter spent in treatment at the 
. wholly unreasonable', hospital. However, such a request is 
,,j 
inasmuch as there is no record that the appellant himse .. 
even requested transfer at that time. Moreover, the Jet. 
-24- I 
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in which the suggestion of transfer was made, was no 
more than a suggestion having no binding force or effect on 
the court. 
As previously stated, the purposes of commitment 
to a mental health facility are entirely different than 
those underlying a sentence to a penal institution. Case 
law supports this view. 
In People v. Safell, 599 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1979), 
the court faced issues similar to those raised by the appellant 
in the present case. In upholding California's mentally 
disordered sex of fender (MDSO) statute against equal 
protection attack, the court noted that the commitment of 
MDSO's is for the purpose of treatment, not punishment, and 
that commitment is not a substitute for punishment. 599 
P.2d at 94, 95. Similar conclusions were reached in Hill v. 
~, 422 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1970), and State v. Newell, 
236 A.2d 656 (Vt. 1967). In Hill, the court agreed that 
"The commitment proceedings under the statute constitute 
neither a civil commitment nor a sentencing procedure, but 
rather an independent criminal proceeding which is triggered 
by a criminal conviction." 422 F.2d at 1197. The court 
agreed further that 
An examination of the statutory 
scheme discloses that the legislature 
did not intend that the criminal conviction 
was to become entirely irrelevant. The 
purposes of the statute are to protect 
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soci~ty from dangerous sex crimes and to 
provide treatment for the dangerous sex 
offender. To accomplish those objectives 
a completely indeterminate sentence is ' 
necessary. 
422 F.2d at 1197. Such statements are evidence that tc 
• 
allow credit for commitment to a sex offenders program:! 
offset the time to be served in a penal institution wou!" 
seriously undermine the objectives of treatment for the 
sex offender and protection of society. Furthermore, sci 
a credit would encourage sex offenders not suffering frc:, 
mental abnormalities to actively seek commitment so as ti 
serve as much time as possible in the less restrictive 
confines of a mental health facility. In a case factual: 
similar to the instant case, State v. Newell, supra, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault with 
intent to comrni t rape. The court thereafter adjudged tr<, 
defendant to be a psychopathic personality and committee 
the defendant to detention and treatment as a sexual 
psychopath. On direction of the court, three subsequent 
.. i 
hearings were conducted to review the defendant's statu: '1 
progress. At the last of these hearings, the court founc I 
that the defendant was no longer a psychopathic ' 
. t sentences personality and imposed equal and concurren 
The I of from six to ten years to be served in prison. 
I 
defendant then instituted post-conviction relief proceed:: 
erroneous for failln: contending that the sentences were 
in comm1:''! 
to allow credit for the almost two years served 
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as a psychopathic personality. After recognizing the 
0bjectives of the cornrnitment statute, the court refused to 
credit the defendant's sentences with the almost two years 
spent in commitment. The court reasoned that "[u]nder the pro-
vision of our statute, punishment is withheld until the 
offender's mental condition no longer constitutes a threat to 
the public." 236 A.2d at 658. In the present case, the 
appellant's status in treatment at the state hospital did 
not go unreviewed by the court. The appellant was afforded two 
review hearings prior to the hearing at which he was placed on 
probation. The court apparently found no compelling reason 
to transfer the appellant to the prison or to change his status. 
On the basis of the differences in the purposes for commitment 
and sentencing to a penal institution, credit for commitment 
time served by the appellant is appropriately denied. 
Moreover, the granting of credit for the time 
served by the appellant during his commitment to the state 
hospital is expressly prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 
77-49-7, which states in part: 
The parole, probation, or pardon authority 
may order the probation, parole, or pardon 
following such a certification, and may order 
the release of such persons upon such terms, 
conditions, and limitations as shall appear 
necessary to safeguard the convicted person 
and the public. No statute relating to t~e 
remission of sentences by way of commutation 
time for good behavior, or for work performed 
shall apply to the person committed to the 
Utah state hospital as herein provided. 
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Simply stated, a person who is cormnitted to the state 
hospital can receive no commutation time. 
Even if it were possible for the appella~ 
to be credited with the time served during commitment, 
the issue is more appropriately presented before the 
Board of Pardons. Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-3 states in 
part: 
It shall be the duty of the board of 
pardons to determine by majority decision, 
when and under what conditions, subject to 
the provisions of this act, persons now or 
hereafter serving sentences • . . in t~ 
penal or correctional institutions of this 
state, may be released upon parole, 
pardoned, or may have their fines or 
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences 
commuted or terrnina ted; provided, no fine 
or forfeiture shall be remitted, no parole 
or pardon granted, or commutation or sentencE 
terminated, except after a full hearing 
before said board. 
As indicated, appellant's request for time credit is 
appropriately addressed to the Board of Pardons in the::: 
instance, and not to this Court. In any event, however, 
credit should be denied. 
POINT IV 
IN THE ABSENCE OF APPELLANT'S OBJECTION 
TO THE HABEAS COURT JUDGE AND HIS FAILURE 
TO REQUEST RECUSAL OF THAT JUDGE, THE 
UNSUPPORTED ASSERTION OF "A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST" OH THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT 
JUDGE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The discussion of the waiver doctrine and it' 
f revie> :· 
application to issues not properly preserved or 
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the denial of post conviction relief as contained in 
Point I of this brief, is expressly incorporated in, and 
applied to the instant argument. The appellant has waived 
any consideration of the issue of judge disqualification by 
failing to object below or follow the statutorily prescribed 
procedure contained in Utah Code Annotated 1980 Special 
Supplement effective July 1, 1980. Section 77-35-29 
of that supplement states in part: 
(c) If the prosecution or defendant 
in any criminal action or proceeding shall 
file an affidavit that the judge before whom 
such action or proceeding is to be tried or 
heard as a bias or prejudice, either against 
such party or his attorney or in favor of any 
opposing party to the suit, such judge shall 
proceed no further therein until the challenge 
is disposed of. Every such affidavit shall 
state the facts and reasons for the belief 
that such bias or prejudice exists and shall 
be filed as soon as practicable after the case 
has been assigned or such bias or prejudice 
is known. No such affidavit shall be filed 
unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel 
of record that such affidavit and application are 
made in good faith. 
(See also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 63(b)). In the 
present case, appellant filed no affidavit or certificate 
of good faith at any time before or during the hearing on 
his petition for habeas corpus relief. The absence of 
such an application or objection is sufficient to waive 
review of the issue on appeal. 
In Jackson v. State, 247 S.E.2d 512 (Ga.Ct.App. 
19 7U), the appellant similarly failed to interpose a timely 
objection. As the court stated: 
-29-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
Appellant enumerates as error, in 
each case, the failure of the trial jud~ 
to disqualify himself in a proceeding 
involving the sufficiency of search 
warrants which he had issued personally. 
However, the appellant failed to raise a 
proper objection, and "waiver of 
disqualification of a judge may be 
effected expressly by agreement, or 
impliedly proceeding without objection 
with the trial of the case with knowledge 
of the disqualification. 
i 
Id. In this c~se, the aopellant was aware that the habea i 




probation. Appellant's failure to object should j' 
rewarded by the consideration of this issue on a;c. 
In United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735 (9tt.. 
1978), the appellant filed an affidavit and moved for rec. 
on the ground of bias. The trial judge held the affidavrl 
to be legally insufficient and proceeded to trial on the I 
case. On appeal, the appellant not only alleged this rd, 
to be erroneous, but also alleged that other adverse rul!:: 
made by the trial judge were evidence of bias. The revie• 
court replied to appellant's assertions by noting that a: 
and sufficient affidavit was a prerequisite to recusal. 
F.2d at 738. As to his claims that adverse rulings were 
_ · . 11 t's claims evidence of bias, tne court reJected appe an 
· · t affidavit by stating: "First, no timely and sufficien-
f . 1 d Appellant's failu:e stating these claims was ever i e . 
f e defea'. 
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charge of bias." 581 F.2d at 738. The Ninth Circuit 
court of Appeals further noted the requirements for a 
legally sufficient affidavit: 
Thus, to be legally sufficient, the 
affidavit must meet three requirements. 
It must state facts which if true fairly 
support the allegation that bias or 
prejudice stemming from (1) an extrajudicial 
source (2) may prevent a fair decision on the 
merits. The focus is not only on the source 
of the facts and their distorting effect on 
a decision on the merits as required by 
Grimrnell, but also on (3) the substantiality of 
the support given by these facts to the allega-
tion of bias, as required by Berger. 
Id. Not only has appellant waived the issue of judge 
disgualif ication by failing to interpose a timely objection, 
but also by failing to file the requisite affidavit and 
certificate of good faith. Moreover, had the appellant 
objected and filed his affidavit in a timely manner, the 
merits of the allegations would not have been legally 
sufficient to compel recusal. 
The appellant could have further guarded against 
any potential "conflict of interest" on the part of judges 
of the Third Judicial District by filing his petition in 
another court. Rule 65(f) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states: "The [habeas corpus] cor,1plaint shall 
be filed in the court most convenient to the plaintiff·" 
Tne appellant was thus not limited to filing his petition in 
tne Third Judicial District Court, but could have filed it 
J.n any court of convenience. 
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In view of the fact that appellant cites no 
authority in support of his claim for relief resulting 
from a so-called "conflict of interest," and has waived 
this Court's consideration of the issue by failing to 
object or follow the statutory procedure for judge 
disqualification, this Court should disregard appellant' 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has failed to allege claims upm 
which his requested relief can be granted. Even if thi: 
Court was able to disregard the failure of appellant to 
properly preserve his allegations for appeal, the allega 
are totally lacking in merit in that the appellant was 
properly cornrni tted and sentenced under the laws of this 
state. Furthermore, appellant lacks standing to prosecu 
his due process and equal protection claims because his 
were not adversely affected by the appropriate applicatl 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-49-1 et seq. 
Respondent notes that this brief was prepared 
f · 1 t d Among the numerous deficienc rom an 1ncomp e e recor . 
in the record, the respondent did not have the benefit 0 
reading the contents of the transcript which was designa 
and ordered by the appellant, but was not, for whatever 
42 411 
reason, part of the record on appeal (R. at 41, ' '" 
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The respondent therefore submits this brief in the 
interest of avoiding any further delay, but respectfully 
reserves the right, based on the accompanying motion, 
to submit a supplemental brief in the event that 
respondent's position is prejudiced or compromised by the 
filing of documents and transcripts at some later date 
which are not presently a part of the record on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Uailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
to Hr. Douglas E. \vahlguist, Attorney for Appellant, 
100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 2J!:!=.. day of July, 1981. 
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